Abstract/Summary

This working paper explores the complexities of accountability and human resource management (HRM) within Cambodia’s civil service, particularly in the context of decentralisation and deconcentration (D&D) reforms. It critically examines how centralised control, politicisation, and neo-patrimonial governance structures undermine sub-national accountability and the effectiveness of HRM. Drawing on fieldwork, case studies, and literature review, the paper identifies key constraints such as non-meritocratic recruitment, low pay, fragmented donor modalities, and weak institutional capacity. These factors contribute to rent-seeking behaviors, poor service delivery, and limited motivation among civil servants. The study highlights the need for clearer assignment of employer functions, improved payroll systems, and strategic reforms that align with local realities. It also emphasizes the importance of leveraging successful models like SEILA and PPWSA to inform future HRM decentralisation. The paper concludes with practical recommendations to enhance accountability and performance, advocating for a Cambodian-owned governance system that is responsive, professional, and pro-poor.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.64202/wp.40.200903